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ADAPTING TITLE VHI TO MODERN EMPLOYMENT
REALITIES: THE CASE FOR THE
UNPAID INTERN
Craig J. Ortner
INTRODUCTION
Last September, the Second Circuit handed down a decision that
could significantly affect the courts' future interpretations of the scope
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").' In
O'Connor v. Davis,2 the court held that Bridget O'Connor, an unpaid
intern for the Rockland Psychiatric Center, was not an "employee"
for purposes of Title VII and was therefore precluded from bringing a
sex discrimination action under that title.' O'Connor's internship at
Rockland was a mandatory component of her major in social work for
which she was required to perform 200 hours of field work at one of
several hospitals designated by her college.4 As an intern, O'Connor
was responsible for attending staff meetings with Rockland employ-
ees, meeting with patients both one-on-one and in groups, and docu-
menting the results of these sessions for review by her supervisors.5
O'Connor never completed her internship at Rockland. Shortly af-
ter her arrival, Dr. James Davis, a psychiatrist employed by Rockland,
began tormenting O'Connor with a steady onslaught of verbal as-
saults.6 Among Davis's cruder remarks to O'Connor were his refer-
ence to her as "Miss Sexual Harassment," his suggestion that
O'Connor and other women participate in an "orgy," and an instruc-
tion that O'Connor remove her clothing in preparation for a meeting
with him.7 O'Connor left Rockland after her supervisors failed to
deal adequately with Davis's abusive conduct.'
O'Connor sued Rockland, claiming that she was sexually harassed
in violation of Title VII.9 Without addressing the substantive merits
of O'Connor's Title VII claim, the district court granted Rockland's
motion for summary judgment dismissal, based in part on the court's
finding that O'Connor had received no remuneration for her work at
Rockland. 10 The Court of Appeals affirmed." In upholding the dis-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
2. 126 F3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1048 (1998).
3. Id. at 115.
4. Id. at 113.
5. Id.
6. Davis began harassing O'Connor within two days of her arrival at Rockland.
Id.
7. Id. at 113-14.
8. The court found that although O'Connor reported a good deal of Davis's con-
duct to her supervisor, Rockland "did nothing to remedy the situation." Id. at 114.
9. Id
10. See id at 116.
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trict court's dismissal of O'Connor's Title VII claim, Judge Walker de-
scribed O'Connor as a "volunteer" who received no "benefits" for her
work at Rockland. l2 Consequently, she was not a "hired party"-that
is, she was not an employee of Rockland and, therefore, was not pro-
tected by Title VII. By classifying O'Connor as a "volunteer," the
court appeared to draw a bright line rule that an unpaid intern can
never be considered an "employee" under Title VII. Such a rule,
while good for judicial economy,13 may overlook the fact that most
unpaid internships are anything but "voluntary." 4
O'Connor is one of many cases that has sought to lend clarity to
what has evolved as a murky Title VII jurisprudence, with much of the
confusion centering around the issue of who should be regarded as an
"employee" for purposes of the statute."5 Title VII circularly defines
the term "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer.""
The statute's legislative history is similarly unhelpful, providing few
clues as to where Congress intended to limit the term "employee."1 7
11. Id. at 112.
12. Id. at 116. "Volunteers" are not protected by Title VII because they are "not
susceptible to the discriminatory practices which [Title VII] was designed to elimi-
nate." Smith v. Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
see also Leda E. Dunn, Note, "Protection" of Volunteers Under Federal Employment
Law: Discouraging Voluntarism?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 451, 460-61 (1992) (comment-
ing that courts have not treated unpaid volunteers as employees under Title VII).
13. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 15 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)
("Bright-line rules are indeed useful and sometimes necessary ....").
14. See infra Part L.A (explaining that in today's competitive job market, many
employers require that job applicants acquire work experience before applying, and
that often internship positions are unpaid simply because the demand for them is so
great that employers can avoid having to offer salaries).
15. See Patricia Davidson, The Definition of "Employee" Under Title VII: Distin-
guishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. Cin. L. Rev. 203, 206
(1984) (observing that Congress's vagueness in defining the term "employee" has left
courts with "an essentially barren legislative history with which to interpret a term
that is the basic component of the jurisdictional requirement of the statute"); Dunn,
supra note 12, at 458-61 (tracing judicial efforts to define who constitutes an "em-
ployee" under Title VII).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994). This section reads in pertinent part:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except
that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public of-
fice in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters
thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal
staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser
with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
Id.
17. See Davidson, supra note 15, at 205 (noting that although the legislative his-
tory of Title VII is "replete with references to the goal of implementing a national
policy of equal opportunity for employment free from wrongful discrimination," there
is little on record that reveals the intended scope of that statute). At least one court
has proposed that the term "employee" should be understood according to its com-
mon dictionary meaning, but there is limited support for this conclusion. See Graves
v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that be-
cause the legislative history suggests that the authors of Title VII intended that the
[Vol. 662614
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Despite the uncertainties courts have encountered in defining Title
VII's jurisdictional limits, one fairly consistent trend has been to draw
Title VII's protections expansively, so as to vindicate the statute's
principal aims of eradicating unlawful discrimination in the work-
place."a Thus, Title VII has been found to cover, inter alia, former
employees, 19 an attorney who was denied partnership status by her
law firm,2° and part-time workers.2'
Given the trend favoring an expansive reading of Title VII, the Sec-
ond Circuit's ruling that all unpaid interns are excluded from protec-
tion under Title VII appears misplaced.' In today's job market, an
unpaid internship can represent a crucial step in an individual's pur-
suit of a livelihood.3' Moreover, Title VII's language does not indi-
cate that the statute was intended to cover only salaried employees.24
This Note proposes that if Title VII's goals are to be advanced in
the twenty-first century, courts must acknowledge the significant long-
term benefits that accompany many unpaid internships and that in-
terns rely on in exchange for their services.' As career experts are
acknowledging with increasing regularity, "[wjith some internships,
the payoff is not reflected in the paycheck." 26 Rather than drawing an
arbitrary line around wages, which threatens to unfairly exclude un-
paid interns in contravention of Title VII's intent, this Note proposes
alternative methods by which courts may measure employee status
under Title VII.
Part I analyzes current employment trends, specifically the role that
unpaid internships play in individual career development. Part I
points to the blurry, if not illusory, distinction between paid and un-
paid interns, and demonstrates that both employees and employers
term "employer" be understood according to its dictionary definition, the word "em-
ployee" should be similarly interpreteted).
18. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of em-
ployment opportunities .... "); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir.
1983) ("[T]he term employee in Title VII 'must be read in light of the mischief to be
corrected and the end to be attained."' (quoting Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548
F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1977))); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir.
1979) ("[Blecause [Title VII] is remedial in character, it should be liberally construed,
and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the complaining party.").
19. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 848 (1997).
20. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
21. See Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
22. For a discussion of O'Connor, see supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir.
1993) (asserting that under Title VII "compensation is not defined by statute or case
law").
25. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
26. Jay Heflin & Richard Thau, Tire Internship Experience, in Peterson's Intern-
ships 3 (18th ed. 1997); see Mary Beth Marklein, Interns Invest Tune in Future, USA
Today, June 7, 1995, at 5D (commenting that sometimes the long term rewards of an
unpaid internship are more important than salary).
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reap substantial benefits from an internship experience. Part II ex-
plores Congress's intent in enacting Title VII. It first discusses the
broad policy goals behind Title VII, and then turns to the specific
question of how Title VII defines the term "employee." Part III ex-
plains that a court will only treat a person as an "employee" under
Title VII if there is evidence that an "employment relationship" ex-
isted between the person and his putative employer. While courts
have liberally construed the "employment relationship," virtually all
courts require that an employee receive some "compensation" in ex-
change for services rendered. Part III then reviews the three judicial
tests under which courts have analyzed employee status in the context
of "independent contractor" cases-that is, cases where a person is
alleged to be an independent contractor rather than an employee and
thus not protected by Title VII. These tests are useful for determining
what courts have emphasized in defining who is an employee under
Title VII.
Lastly, in part IV, this Note argues that many unpaid interns receive
benefits that constitute the "compensation" needed to establish an
employment relationship. It further argues that the "hybrid" test that
courts use to analyze "independent contractor" cases is applicable to
other types of cases involving issues of employee status; under this
comprehensive test, unpaid interns may be employees. This Note
then proposes that even if courts decline to apply the "hybrid" test to
cases involving unpaid interns, they should consider an unpaid intern's
employment realities before determining whether an unpaid intern is
an employee under Title VII.
I. UNPAID INTERNSHIPS: BENEFITS TO INTERNS AND EMPLOYERS
Internships, including unpaid internships, play a significant role in
today's job market. This section explores the ways in which intern-
ships help to further individual career ambitions and examines the
benefits that employers derive from sponsoring unpaid interns. It
concludes that both the interns and their employers receive valuable
consideration from the internship experience.
A. The Value of Internships in Today's Job Market
Employment realities have changed dramatically in recent years.2 7
As the job market becomes increasingly specialized and diverse, 8 job
applicants are likely to find significantly heightened expectations from
their potential employers. Many employers require that candidates
27 See Christopher Conte, Labor Letter, Wall St. J., June 15, 1993, at Al (noting
several changing trends in the workplace, including a "tight labor market"); Eugene
H. Fram, Today's Mercurial Career Path, Mgmt. Rev., Nov. 1994, at 41 (bemoaning
the "current economic turmoil" that has left many "scrambling for jobs-any type of
job").
28. See Fram, supra note 27.
2616 [Vol. 66
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for skilled-labor positions, even entry-level positions, include work ex-
perience in the field among their qualifications. 29 Recent graduates
are discovering that "any attempt to use a college degree alone as a
route to career stability and success is likely to be met with
frustration."30
Moreover, heightened employer expectations have created a
"catch-22" in today's job market: Employers tend to hire only exper-
ienced personnel, but college graduates possess little applicable expe-
rience.3 This trend is particularly prevalent in certain highly com-
petitive career fields such as entertainment, electronic media, and
sports.32 College graduates are not the only ones who stand to benefit
from pre-graduation work experience. A survey of recent law school
graduates revealed that performance of a "legal clerkship"33 while in
law school has a "dramatic effect" on a law student's ability to obtain
his or her first full-time legal position upon graduation.' Other grad-
uate students have similarly emphasized the importance of obtaining
work experience prior to completing their degree. 5
To facilitate the increasingly difficult transition from college into the
job market, colleges and universities, and employers themselves, have
encouraged students to seek internships while in college, graduate
school, during the summer, or even after graduation.-' Students have
recognized the value of internships as well: Today, nearly three-
29. See Heflin & Thau, supra note 26. at 3; Mark Oldman & Samer Hamadeh,
America's Top Internships at xiii (1997 ed. 1996) ("For many employers, good grades
and the right college major are just not enough; they seek employees who have paid
their dues in the working world.").
30. Fram, supra note 27, at 42; see also Paul Osterman. The Great American Job
Hunt, Current, Mar. 1, 1995, at 13 ("A staple of the Generation X story is the young
person who invested in four years of college and yet finds himself in a job well below
what he expected, both in terms of what it demands and what it pays.").
31. See Heflin & Thau, supra note 26, at 3.
32. See Marklein, supra note 26.
33. Donald N. Zillman & Vickie R. Gregory, Law Student Employnent and Legal
Education, 36 J. Legal Educ. 390, 391 (1986). A legal clerkship is a position at a law
firm, corporation, or government agency. Id.
34. See Jill Chaifetz, The Value qf Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro
Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1695, 1708 (1993) (citing Zillman & Greg-
ory, supra note 33, at 391). The Zillman and Gregory study also reported that many
students felt that their efficiency in law school increased during the time of their clerk-
ship, as did their appreciation of their academic work. Zillman & Gregory. supra note
33, at 398-99. Although the aforementioned study surveyed students working in paid
positions, Chaifetz notes that "paid and unpaid internships are similar in some re-
spects, including the types of legal work that students do." Chaifetz, supra, at 1709.
35. See, e.g., Lisa Musolf Karl, Student Labor Interns Can Be a Valued Resource,
Baltimore Bus. J., Oct. 31, 1997, at 15 (describing the experiences of a doctoral candi-
date who worked as an unpaid intern in a laboratory, and a second-year MBA student
who gained "valuable experience learning what it takes to get a new company going"
in an unpaid marketing internship).
36. See Marklein, supra note 26 (reporting that career experts have advised that
unpaid internships are "worth [the] financial sacrifice"); Oldman & Hamadeh, supra
note 29, at 65, 304, 357 (describing internships at The Carter Center, the Surfrider
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quarters of all college students complete an internship before they
graduate, compared with 1 in 36 who interned in 1980.37
While one apparent advantage to interning, particularly while in
college, is to earn money, unpaid internships are becoming increas-
ingly prevalent and are recognized as a source of invaluable on-the-
job training.38 While students may earn academic credit for interning,
and some are academically required to complete an internship pro-
gram prior to graduation,39 internships need not be for credit, because
for many interns the "payoff" comes in the form of valuable experi-
ence gained by working in a professional environment.40
While certain industries, such as the entertainment industry, are
known to commonly employ interns,41 the range of internships avail-
able in today's job market spans dozens of career fields, including
public, private, and charitable organizations. 4 And although some of
these internships may involve an element of "grunt work, 43 career
experts stress that internships are increasingly "powerful conduit[s] to
the best jobs. 4 4
Foundation, and the White House, which are open respectively, to college students,
graduate students, and recent graduates).
37. Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at Author's Note.
38. See Heflin & Thau, supra note 26, at 3.
39. See, e.g., Diane Harney, Why Businesses Should Pay for Student Internships,
Puget Sound Bus. J., June 6, 1997, at 11 (explaining that in the communications de-
partment at Pacific Lutheran University, every student is required to complete an
internship); Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at xvi (noting that one student
earned academic credits worth about $30,000 in tuition through his "nonpaying in-
ternship"); Eric L. Smith, Breaking into the Biz, Black Enterprise, Dec. 1996, at 93-94
(providing potential applicants with a list of available internships in the entertainment
industry, most of which are unpaid, but for which student-interns earn academic
credit).
40. See Heflin & Thau, supra note 26, at 3.
41. The "Late Show with David Letterman" and "MTV" have two of the more
notable and sought after internship programs in the entertainment world. See Oldman
& Hamadeh, supra note 29, at 175, 211.
42. America's Top Internships provides an extremely diversified listing of avail-
able internship opportunities. For example, it offers descriptions of the Elite Model
Management Corporation internship, which provides an opportunity for interns to
"assis[t] employees in every capacity, from the clerical duties to the actual work of the
booking agents," Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at 101, The Carter Center, "a
think tank to improve the quality of life for people around the world," where interns
"work[ ] with world leaders and dignitaries to promote democracy, resolve conflicts,
protect human rights, eradicate disease, improve agriculture in developing countries,
and tackle social problems in urban areas," id. at 65, and an internship at the Smithso-
nian Institution, where interns may be placed "among 40 museums, administrative
offices, and research programs," id. at 278. All of the above are unpaid internships.
43. Stephen E. Frank, Workplace: Taking Out the Garbage, Walking the Boss's
Dog and Other Interns' Tales, Wall St. J., July 19, 1994, at B1. As an example of
"grunt work," Frank recounts the story of one intern whose supervisor asked him to
load his own car with leaking bags of refuse and then drive around until he found a
dumpster. Id.
44. Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at xiii.
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In addition, eager applicants hoping to thrust a foot through the
proverbial door rapidly fill available internships, including unpaid po-
sitions. One intern admits to having "lived essentially (like) a bum"
while working without pay at ABC's "Nightline" in the hope of realiz-
ing what she regarded as a "once-in-a-life chance."45 Another worked
from 6 P.M. to 2 A.M. at a bar to support himself during his unpaid
internship at MTV.4' Ultimately, individuals who choose to make
such sacrifices do so primarily because they identify an internship as
the "most bankable credential you can put on a resume."47 Given the
axiom that "experience is the best teacher," many people have found
internship programs to be the ideal way to get an early initiation into
the workforce.'
B. Benefits Employers Derive From Unpaid Interns
Interns are not the only ones who stand to gain from an internship.
Employers who sponsor internships derive significant benefits from
interns, particularly unpaid interns whose work has been cynically
characterized as a form of "slave labor."49 In many organizations,
there is little discernable difference in job description between paid
and unpaid internship positions.50 This increasingly blurred distinc-
tion has raised questions regarding the appropriateness of denying in-
terns salary,5' and has even prompted labor disputes with unions
accusing employers of attempting to skim costs by replacing union
employees with unpaid interns.52 In short, unpaid interns are not un-
paid due to some qualitative difference in the type of work per-
formed,53 but because there is an ample supply of young laborers who
are willing to work "for nothing., 54
45. Marklein, supra note 26.
46. IL
47. Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at xiii (quotations omitted).
48. Smith, supra note 39, at 93.
49. Lou Prato, Internships: Invaluable Experience or Slave Labor?, Electronic
Media, Aug. 19, 1996, at 1.
50. See, eg., Frank, supra note 43 (citing one MTV executive as acknowledging
that paid and unpaid interns have "similar responsibilites"); Marklein, supra note 26
(reporting that in some of the more highly competitive fields, employers -can get
away without paying people ... because the competition's stiff") (quotations omit-
ted); Prato, supra note 49 (stating that radio and television stations would pay interns
but for the fact that students are "lined up [and] willing to work for free") (quotations
omitted).
51. See Harney, supra note 39, at 11 (arguing that because interns provide valua-
ble services for employers, and many interns must endure serious economic hardship
in order to maintain their unpaid position, few employers are justified in denying pay
to interns).
52. See Robert Feder, Unpaid TV Interns Prompt Union Static, Chi. Sun-Times,
June 23, 1988, at 65.
53. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
54. Conte, supra note 27.
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Despite acknowledgment that interns perform the work of regular
employees, employers have refused to characterize them as such when
doing so would require the employer to provide an extra benefit to
the intern. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")55
requires that employers pay their employees minimum wage.56 The
Department of Labor has waived this requirement with respect to
"trainees," however, if the employer derives no "immediate advan-
tage" from the putative trainee's services .5  Although many employ-
ers continue to classify their unpaid interns as "trainees" for purposes
of the FLSA, the typical internship experience belies the statutory re-
quirement that employers derive no benefit from their unpaid in-
terns.58 Thus, notwithstanding the tendency of many employers to
view themselves as performing a gratuitous service for their interns
and receiving no consideration in return, the facts paint a considerably
different picture.59 Interns can be a valuable resource and have made
significant contributions in a wide range of fields.6" As one small busi-
ness owner recently commented when referring to a pair of unpaid
55. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219, 251-262 (1994).
56. Id. § 206.
57. Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Relation-
ships Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (WH Pub. 1297, 1985); see also Kelly Jor-
dan, Note, FLSA Restrictions on Volunteerism: The Institutional and Individual Costs
in a Changing Economy, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 302, 315-16 (1993) (reciting the criteria
used to distinguish "trainees" from "employees" under the FLSA). The requirement
that employers receive no immediate advantage from the trainee's services is only one
of six requirements that an individual must satisfy to qualify as a "trainee." Id. Col-
lectively, the requirements suggest that the person must be doing the service for sub-
stantially educational purposes, with the employer functioning more as an educator
than an employer. See id.
58. See Prato, supra note 49 (quoting Verne Stone, Professor Emeritus at the Uni-
versity of Missouri School of Journalism, who notes that the issue of payment versus
non-payment in journalism rests more on "supply and demand" than on substantive
differences in responsibility). Two issues arise from this discussion. The first question
is whether all unpaid interns, given the significant contributions they provide for em-
ployers, ought to be compensated in fairness to both the interns and the employer's
competition. The latter may be placed at a competitive disadvantage when forced to
pay for the same labor that an intern performs for free. See supra note 57 and accom-
panying text; see also Donald T. O'Connor, The Price of Free Labor, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1997, at 78 (1997). Secondly, given the enhanced role of internships in individual
career development, Congress might consider amending the FLSA by easing mini-
mum wage restrictions to accommodate employers who employ certain types of labor-
ers at sub-minimum wage. Under a more relaxed minimum wage regime, employers
would be less concerned with reprisal under the FLSA, and consequently sponsor
greater numbers of unpaid interns, and other forms of "volunteer" labor. See Dunn,
supra note 12, 463-66. But see Harney, supra note 39, at 11 (arguing that employers
should be required to pay interns because of the substantial benefit they gain from
internships and to prevent hardship to the interns). A comprehensive treatment of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Note.
59. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at xv (reporting that interns at
3M and Reebok have contributed to substantive projects); Frank, supra note 43 ("The
Wall Street Journal's internship program ... [is] a full-body plunge into a chilly sea of
journalistic responsibility .... "); Karl, supra note 35, at 15 (noting that interns can be
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interns working for her company, "We treat them as though they are
employees, which they are. "61
In addition to obtaining free labor, many employers use their in-
ternships as a means of selecting permanent employees.6" This tech-
nique allows employers to get a "sneak preview" of what a potential
full time employee can offer and is a cost effective means of filling
permanent positions.63 The practice of stocking corporate "bull pens"
with unpaid interns is popular among several prominent employers,
including Hewlett-Packard, Kraft General Foods, Ruder-Finn, and
Bertelsmann Music Group, and is likely to be adopted by others as
employers continue to realize the value of reduced search costs.'
Contrary to the myth that an internship is a "donation" of training,
running unilaterally from the company to the intern, experience dem-
onstrates the reverse to be true.65 In fact, the benefit of an internship
program is often greater to the sponsor than to its interns. 6 Thus, an
internship experience might appropriately be referred to as a "syn-
ergy," with the intern earning "practical knowledge about a current
major or career interest," and the company receiving in exchange a
means of improving its "bottom line."'6 7 Moreover, while many com-
panies provide interns with some monetary compensation, the "top"
internships are rated as such because of less tangible factors, such as
"behind-the-scenes exposure," their function as "treasure troves" for
networking, and valuable work experience.'
Many unpaid interns rely heavily on their internships to promote
their career ambitions. The denial of an internship opportunity on an
impermissible basis such as race or sex can represent a great loss and
lead to irreversible harm, particularly when sexual harassment drives
an intern away from her position. As the next section discusses, Con-
gress enacted Title VII as a means of guaranteeing that such harms
would find redress in the court system.
valuable to employers, particularly small businesses that require assistance with spe-
cial projects).
61. Karl, supra note 35, at 15.
62. See Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at xiv.
63. Id.
64. See id.; Heflin and Than, supra note 26, at 3 ("After interning with a company,
many individuals will be invited to become a part of the permanent staff."); see also
Fram, supra note 27, at 43 (predicting that as "job apprenticeships" become more
common, "companies may seek to evaluate final job applicants via unpaid
internships").
65. See Heflin & Thau, supra note 26, at 4.
66. Id
67. Id at 5.
68. See Oldman & Hamadeh, supra note 29, at xv.
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II. TITLE VII AND THE STATUTORY SCOPE OF COVERED
"EMPLOYEES"
This part provides a brief introduction to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 69 including Congress's intent in en-
acting anti-discrimination legislation in the employment sphere and
Title VII's jurisdictional limits. This part then turns to the legal his-
tory of Title VII in search of an answer to the question of who is a
covered "employee" under Title VII.
A. Title VII Generally
Before turning to the question of who is an "employee" under Title
VII, it is useful to first explore Congress's goals in enacting Title VII.
This section reviews the legislative history and explains how sexual
harassment has come to be defined as a form of sex-based discrimina-
tion, prohibited by Title VII.
1. Legislative History
Congress enacted Title VII as part of a comprehensive Civil Rights
Act that was designed to address the serious problem of racial dis-
crimination in American society.7" Although Title VII prohibited
only racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination in its original proposed
form, a late-hour amendment included the insertion of the word "sex"
into the bill.7' Thus, Title VII, in its current form, expressly forbids
employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.72 Moreover, Title VII features ancillary prohibi-
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
70. See Charles A. Sullivan et al., Employment Law 473 (1993) (observing that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to deal with "the pervasive
problem of employment discrimination"); Charles & Barbara Whalen, The Longest
Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act passim (1985); Suzanne
Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and
the First Amendment. No Collision in Sight, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 461, 481 (1995) (not-
ing that the Civil Rights Act was "passed in response to the mounting popular de-
mand to extend constitutional equality protections to African-Americans").
71. See Whalen & Whalen, supra note 70, at 115-18. Ironically, the Smith Amend-
ment, which called for inclusion of sex among the protected categories, was intended
to derail Title VII. Id. at 116. Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia, a staunch
opponent of the anti-discrimination bill, introduced the amendment as part of a plan
to ruin the bill. Id. at 115-16. Smith assumed that his proposal would pass in the
Judiciary Committee, but he was certain that many Congressmen would oppose a bill
that gave women equal job rights with men, thus making the resolution so controver-
sial that it would be voted down either in the House or Senate. Id. The plan backfired
when too many Congressmen felt compelled to "demonstrate their support for moth-
erhood," and voted in favor of the resolution that would eventually become Title VII.
Id. at 118.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). Specifically, the statute
defines it as an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
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tions aimed at combating discrimination in the workplace.'- These in-
clude a prohibition of retaliating against an employee for charging an
employer with discriminatory conduct,7' and a prohibition against
publishing advertisements that indicate a prohibited preference."
Moreover, these prohibitions apply to agents of an employer as well
as the employer itself.76 In short, the authors of Title VII intended to
eliminate discrimination in employment by passing a law that would
declare "the right of persons to be free from [improper] discrimina-
tion. ' 77 In addition, Title VII's protections were intended to be com-
prehensive and not diluted by concerns for judicial economy, which
might otherwise encourage a narrower reading.
78
2. Extension of Title VII to Sexual Harassment Claims
Title VII specifically forbids employers from firing or refusing to
hire an individual based on protected characteristics such as race and
sex,7 9 and further mandates that these characteristics are not to be
considered with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely effect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
74. Id. § 2000e-3(a); see also Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692,
694-96 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the Title VII provision prohibiting retaliation
against persons filing discrimination complaints protects employees who file a dis-
crimination complaint against their employer, even if there is a reasonable mistake in
the allegation); Robert Keith Shikiar, Title VII Retaliation Claims, 57 Geo. Wash. L
Rev. 1168 (1989) (discussing remedies available under Title VII for persons retaliated
against for reporting employment discrimination); see generally Douglas E. Ray, Title
VII Retaliation Cases: Creating a New Protected Class, 58 U. Pitt. L Rev. 405 (1997)
(reviewing the retaliation provision, including scope, methods of proof, and
remedies).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b); see also Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006,
1007-08 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding that a "Help Wanted-Female" advertisement vio-
lated Title VII because Title VII expressly prohibits publication of advertisements
indicating a preference based on sex); Sangree, supra note 70, at 522 (explaining that
an advertisement for "men only" violates Title VII).
76. See Slack v. Havens, 1973 WL 339, 341 (S.D. Cal. 1973), affd as modified, 522
F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that defendant employer cannot be allowed to
divorce its agent's conduct from itself).
77. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2401.
78. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3rd
Cir. 1977) ("The congressional mandate that the federal courts provide relief is
strong; it must not be thwarted by concern for judicial economy.").
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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ployment. '' 80 The "terms, conditions, or privileges" clause has been
used to place sexual harassment claims within Title VII's jurisdic-
tion.81 This is generally accomplished in one of two ways: the em-
ployee may either allege that the employer engaged in "quid pro quo"
sexual harassment, or she may claim that the employer created a "hos-
tile work environment. ' 8  A quid pro quo plaintiff typically alleges
that the employer conditioned employee benefits on compliance with
sexual demands.83 In a hostile work environment case, the employee
claims that the employer has created a hostile environment in which
the "day-to-day working environment has been polluted with verbal
or physical abuses."'  Each of these two forms of sexual harassment is
"[w]ithout question" a form of sex-based discrimination, and there-
fore a violation of Title VII.8 1
80. See id.; see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (finding
that by creating a sexually hostile work environment, the employer had discriminated
against the employee in the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment, thereby
violating Title VII); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74-75 (1984) (holding
that an implicit promise that an associate in a law firm would be considered for pro-
motion to partner in a law firm was included among the "terms, conditions, or privi-
leges" of employment protected by Title VII).
81. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (holding that the phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" encompasses the "entire spectrum of disparate treatment,"
not just "economic" or "tangible" discrimination (citations omitted)); Tomkins, 568
F.2d at 1045 (finding illegal sex discrimination where employer made compliance with
sexual demands a condition of employment).
82. See Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice § 2.2
(1990).
83. Id.; see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910-11 & n.22 (11th Cir.
1982) (noting that quid pro quo harassment usually involves a situation in which a
supervisor demands sexual consideration in exchange for employment benefits); Horn
v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 603-04 (7th Cir.
1985) (finding that quid pro quo sexual harassment had occurred when plaintiff was
pressured to submit to sexual advances that amounted to an "additional[ I humiliating
condition" of her continued employment); Laura E. Fitzrandolph, Comment, Title
VII-Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1168, 1169-70
(1996) ("The quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment requires a plaintiff to show
that a tangible job benefit or privilege is conditioned on the plaintiff succumbing to
another employee's sexual advances or that adverse consequences will result from a
refusal to comply."). Fitzrandolph reviewed five criteria a plaintiff must satisfy to
create a showing of quid pro quo sexual harassment. Id.
84. Conte, supra note 82, at § 2.2; see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (finding that prohib-
ited sexual misconduct constitutes sexual harassment "whether or not it is directly
linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where 'such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment"' (citations
omitted)); see also Fitzrandolph, supra note 83, at 1170 (explaining that only those
plaintiffs who can establish a pattern of harassment that was so "severe or pervasive"
that it "created an abusive working environment" will triumph under a "hostile work
environment" theory).
85. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. In Meritor the Court held that a claim of "hostile
environment" sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII. Id. at 73.
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B. Title VII's Definition of "Employee"
Although Title VII is specific regarding certain elements of its juris-
dictional scope,8 6 it is remarkably vague in defining who constitutes an
"employee." Title VII defines the term "employee" as simply "an in-
dividual employed by an employer." 8 While this definition provides
scarce insight on where to draw the line defining the class of protected
persons, it is generally accepted that Congress intended Title VII to be
understood in the broadest possible terms.88
Additionally, the statute and the legislative history contain two pos-
sible clues as to Congress's intent regarding who constitutes an em-
ployee. First, Title VII is specific as to those workers who may not be
deemed an "employee" under Title VII.89 This group includes public
officials, any person serving on a public official's staff, an appointee to
a public official's office who is charged with policy-making, or an im-
mediate advisor to a public official.90 Given the specific statement of
who is exempted from consideration as an employee under Title VII,
one might infer that beyond those named exceptions, "Congress in-
tended to cover the full range of workers who may be subject to the
harms the statute was designed to prevent."9 Thus, the word "em-
ployee" might arguably be interpreted as broadly as is reasonably pos-
sible in order to satisfy Title VII's legislative intent.92
Secondly, Title VII's legislative history reveals that one of the prin-
cipal authors of the statute intended for the word "employer" to be
understood by its "common dictionary meaning, except as expressly
qualified by the act."'93 Some courts have inferred from this statement
that the term "employee" must also be understood according to its
86. For example, Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employ-
ees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
87. Id. § 2000e(f).
88. See, eg., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[Blecause
[Title VII] is remedial in character, it should be liberally construed, and ambiguities
should be resolved in favor of the complaining party."); see also Armbruster v. Quinn,
711 F.2d 1332, 1339-42 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that Title VII would regard em-
ployees of a subsidiary corporation as employees of the parent corporation rather
than independent contractors because the Act was intended to cover -the full range
of workers who may be subject to the harms the statute was designed to prevent");
Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The elimina-
tion of discrimination in employment is the purpose behind Title VII and the statute
is entitled to a liberal interpretation." (quoting Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit
Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D. Minn. 1977))); Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Em-
ployee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 Win. & Mary L Rev. 75,75 (1984)
(commenting that "courts have liberally interpreted the substantive and procedural
provisions of Title VII to ensure the achievement of [statutory] goals").
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
90. Id.
91. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1339.
92. See idU at 1340.
93. 110 Cong. Rec. 7216 (1964) (memorandum of Sen. Clark to Sen. Dirksen).
The legislative history is silent regarding the intended meaning of the term "em-
ployee." See Davidson, supra note 15, at 205.
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common dictionary definition.94 Reliance on the dictionary meaning
favors a broad reading of the term "employee":95 Webster's Diction-
ary defines an "employee" as "[o]ne who works for another in return
for a salary, wages, or other consideration.' 96 That definition invites a
comprehensive understanding of the term "employee" for purposes of
Title VII in that the word "consideration" can refer to a number of
things besides salary.97
Despite these possible clues, Congress's specific intent regarding
what limitations should be placed on the term "employee" remains a
source of confusion.98 Given the sparse legislative history and lack of
a firm statutory directive, the question of who constitutes an employee
has, by default, been left for judicial resolution.99 As courts grapple
with that question, they face the arduous challenge of delimiting clear
boundaries to Title VII, while ensuring the proper achievement of the
statute's critical goals.
III. JUDICIALLY CREATED TESTS FOR DEFINING EMPLOYEES
UNDER TITLE VII
Courts have applied different standards for determining who is an
employee under Title VII. The issue most often arises in cases where
a court must decide whether a person is an employee or an independ-
ent contractor, 100 with only the former being entitled to Title VII pro-
94. See Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990)
(noting that the legislative history of Title VII explicitly provides that the dictionary
definition should govern the interpretation of "employer" under Title VII, and there-
fore the term "employee" should be treated similarly); see also Haavistola v. Commu-
nity Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Graves as support
for the proposition that dictionary definitions should govern interpretation of the
words "employer" and "employee").
95. See Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220 (holding that the type of compensation a putative
employee must receive in order to have had adequate consideration to enter into a
bona fide employment relationship is not well defined, and therefore must be decided
on an ad hoc basis). But see Graves, 907 F.2d at 73-74 (citing Webster's Third New
International Dictionary as support for its finding that a rodeo racer was not an "em-
ployee" of a nonprofit association that organized female rodeo contestants and sanc-
tioned rodeo events).
96. New Illustrated Webster's Dictionary 318 (1992) (emphasis added).
97. Applying the legal definition of "consideration" would almost certainly sup-
port a broader reading of the word "employee." See Randy E. Bamett, Contracts:
Cases and Doctrine 669 (1995) (explaining that under basic contract law, "considera-
tion" can be defined simply as one's "motive" in making a promise and that a person
may have an infinite number of valid motives when making a promise).
98. See Davidson, supra note 15, at 203 (discussing the various ways in which
courts have grappled with the question of whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor); Dowd, supra note 88, passim (discussing different standards
courts have used to determine who qualifies as an employee under Title VII); Dunn,
supra note 12, at 470 (noting a discrepancy between the courts' refusals to classify
volunteers as employees under Title VII and the statute's remedial goals).
99. See infra Part III.A.
100. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding
certain "manufacturer's representatives" to be employees, rather than independent
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tection. In these cases, a court's analysis relies heavily on common
law principles of agency, particularly the employer's "right to control"
the regular activities of the putative employee. 10' When a case re-
quires distinguishing an employee from other non-employees besides
independent contractors, however, courts rely less on common law
tests and more on the presence or absence of an ordinary "employ-
ment relationship."
This part begins by surveying the three principal tests that courts
have used to distinguish employees from independent contractors:
The right to control test, the economic realities test, and the "hybrid"
test, which incorporates the first two. Although these tests might be
limited to the "independent contractor" context, they are useful to
explore what courts consider in determining employee status. This
part then explains that, in cases involving employee status generally,
many courts eschew common law tests in favor of the more fundamen-
tal inquiry of whether an "ordinary employment relationship" exists
between parties. The scope of the "employment relationship" may be
interpreted broadly to comport with the legislative goals of Title VII,
but as this part explains, courts have generally insisted that an em-
ployment relationship feature the exchange of labor for some "com-
pensation." The term compensation, however, may be susceptible to
multiple meanings.
A. Judicial Treatment of Independent Contractors Versus
Employees
Although courts have devoted considerable attention to the ques-
tion of employee status under Title VII, most of the cases addressing
this issue have focused on the specific problem of separating employ-
ees from independent contractors.1 2 To aid in this inquiry, courts
have devised a series of tests rooted in the common law of agency."0 3
These tests, while arguably less applicable outside the limited context
contractors under Title VII); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341-42 (1lth Cir.
1982) (holding that a janitor could not sue his employer under Title VII because he
was an independent contractor, not an employee).
101. At common law, independent contractors were not considered employees be-
cause they were not subject to the same degree of control as regular employees, and
control was considered a "basic ingredient" in the employer-employee relationship.
See Davidson, supra note 15, at 207-08.
102. See id. at 204 (describing the "recurring problem" courts have faced in distin-
guishing independent contractors from employees under Title VII); Dowd, supra note
88, at 75-77 (describing the tension courts have faced in upholding Title VII's goals
while remaining faithful to common law principles). Independent contractors,
broadly defined, are people who work for themselves and therefore are not employ-
ees under Title VII. See Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 104 (8th Cir.
1994) (citing Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829-30 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
103. See Dowd, supra note 88, at 80 ("The classic formulation of the test [for an
employment relationship] is stated in section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, which distinguishes between servants or employees and independent
contractors.").
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104of "independent contractor" cases, are nonetheless useful for ana-
lyzing the factors courts have considered when defining employment
relationships generally. 105 The three principal tests that courts have
relied on in the independent contractor context are reviewed below.
1. The Right to Control Test
Courts have traditionally used the "right to control" test to distin-
guish between employees and independent contractors. 10 6 Courts ap-
plying this test have examined the "right to control" reserved by the
person for whom the work is being done, "not only as to the result
accomplished by the work, but also as to the details and means by
which that result is accomplished.' 1 7 Under the right to control test,
it is the "element of control that distinguishes the employer-employee
relationship from the independent contractor relationship,"'0 8 with
"control" being viewed "as a relative factor ... judged not by its ac-
tual exercise but rather by the employer's authority to use it."'1 9 This
test has been rejected by most courts because, by promoting a "lim-
ited, mechanistic analysis" of the employment relationship, it tends to
exclude the greatest number of persons from Title VII coverage." 0
For example, courts relying on a right to control analysis might ex-
clude workers from protection under Title VII simply because they
are paid on commission or work flexible hours to accommodate cli-
ents, while precluding a fuller examination of "the nature of the inter-
action between [the] workers and the employer.""'
104. See infra Part III.B.
105. This statement is particularly true with respect to the "economic realities" test,
discussed infra Part III.A.2, and the "hybrid" test, discussed infra Part III.A.3. These
tests tend to focus less on the employer's "right to control" and more on the putative
employee's economic necessity in performing services for the employer. Thus, these
tests are more easily transferable to the broader context of whether an employment
relationship exists in general, as opposed to the narrower context of whether a person
is an employee or an independent contractor.
106. 1 Matthew Bender, Employment Discrimination § 4.02, at 4-11 to -12 (2d ed.
1997).
107. Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd, 580
F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting NLRB v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986
(7th Cir. 1948)). For a discussion of how courts have applied the traditional "right to
control" analysis, see Dowd, supra note 88, at 80-86.
108. Davidson, supra note 15, at 207. One who hires an independent contractor
contracts for a specified result, and therefore exercises "little or no control over the
execution of the job." Id.
109. Dowd, supra note 88, at 80-81.
110. Id. at 83; see also 1 Matthew Bender, supra note 106, § 4.02, at 4-12 (character-
izing the right to control test as the "most stringent" of the tests for distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors).
111. Dowd, supra note 88, at 85.
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2. The Economic Realities Test
In response to the highly rigid right to control test, the Sixth Circuit
introduced the "economic realities" test for measuring employee sta-
tus under Title VII in Armbruster v. Quinn.11"2 In Armbruster, the
court was called upon to resolve the issue of whether certain "manu-
facturer's representatives," who did not work in the defendant's cor-
porate office, sold product lines beside those of the defendant, and
received no salary apart from commissions, could nevertheless be con-
strued as employees under Title VII.113 The court held that they
could, thus rejecting the notion that the term "employee" was meant
"in a technical sense.""' 4 Instead, the proper standard for determining
employee status under Title VII" 5 was one that "examine[d] the eco-
nomic realities underlying the relationship between the individual and
the so-called principal in an effort to determine whether that individ-
ual is likely to be susceptible to the discriminatory [employment]
practices.""116
This standard, which the Armbruster court borrowed from a 1944
Supreme Court case interpreting the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA")," 7 mandates that when employment status is in doubt,
statutes designed to protect workers should be applied broadly, "upon
an examination of [the] 'underlying economic facts.""'" By adopting
this broad test for employee status, the Sixth Circuit downplayed com-
mon law distinctions between employees and independent contractors
based on the employer's right to control the employee. 9 Instead, the
test focuses on a person's economic dependency on the putative em-
ployment relationship, measured from the perspective of the em-
112. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
113. Id at 1339.
114. Id. at 1341.
115. Although Armbruster set out to determine whether certain workers were em-
ployees or independent contractors, the court gave no indication that the "economic
realities" test should be limited to independent contractor cases, and, in fact, the test
may be applicable to all cases involving employee status under Title VII. See infra
Part IV.B.
116. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1340.
117. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322 U.S. 111, 131-32 (1944) (construing
the National Labor Relations Act broadly by emphasizing the economic dependency
of a group of newsboys in rejecting the defendant employer's assertion that the news-
boys were independent contractors).
118. Davidson, supra note 15, at 210 (quoting Hearst, 322 U.S. at 129).
119. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1341; see also Davidson, supra note 15, at 219-22 (dis-
cussing generally the holding in Armbruster). The Sixth Circuit is apparently the only
circuit that discounts the employer's "right to control" altogether. See 1 Matthew
Bender, supra note 106, § 4.02, at 4-17 to -18 (noting that for some time, it appeared
as though the Seventh Circuit would join the Sixth in favoring the -economic reali-
ties" test, but that this no longer appears to be the case). Those courts that have
rejected the Sixth Circuit's approach have drawn criticism, however, for not being
more open to the "economic realities" test. See Dowd, supra note 88, at 112-14.
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ployee. 12 ° The "economic realities" analysis offers the advantages of
"avoid[ing] the rigidity of the common law test and . . . ac-
comodat[ing] the present range of employment relationships and the
new patterns that may evolve in the future."' 12 1 Courts, however, have
generally eschewed the test: By refusing to read any restriction on
Title VII's breadth beyond the vague requirement that employees be
vulnerable to "the kind of employment practices that Title VII was
intended to prevent,' a2 the Sixth Circuit's analysis fails to provide a
clear, workable standard for defining employee status.
3. The "Hybrid" Approach
Most courts apply a "hybrid" standard that combines elements of
both the "right to control" test and the "economic realities test."1 23
This hybrid test, first adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Spirides v. Reinhardt,2 4 directs a court to consider the economic reali-
ties of a relationship in light of the employer's right to control, with
the emphasis being on the latter.'2 5 Under a hybrid analysis, "it is the
economic realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common
law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the
employee that are determinative [of employee status]."12 6 Thus, for
example, when the Spirides court offered some relevant considera-
tions for determining employee status under Title VII, it cited several
factors indicative of a control analysis, but added factors unrelated to
control, including the "intention of the parties."'2 7
When considering whether a person is an employee or an independ-
ent contractor, courts still rely heavily on the common law "right to
control" analysis.'2 8 The Sixth Circuit's "economic realities" test,
however, and to a lesser degree the "hybrid" test, emphasize more
generalized considerations beyond the mere right to control, arguably
rendering these tests more appropriate to the question of who is an
employee generally. Nevertheless, many courts have regarded these
tests as only marginally useful, if not wholly inapplicable, to questions
of employee status outside the independent contractor setting.12 9 The
following section explores how courts have analyzed questions of em-
ployee status in other contexts.
120. Dowd, supra note 88, at 112.
121. Id. at 113.
122. 1 Matthew Bender, supra note 106, § 4.02, at 4-18.
123. See Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994); Deal v.
State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1993); see also 1 Mat-
thew Bender, supra note 106, § 4.02, at 4-12 (reporting that most courts have adopted
the hybrid test).
124. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
125. See id. at 831-32.
126. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1982).
127. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832.
128. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
129. See infra Part III.B.
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B. The "Employment Relationship" Requirement
Common law tests for measuring employee status, derived from the
common law of agency, 130 have emphasized the degree of control ex-
ercised by the employer over the putative employee.1 31 These tests,
while useful for purposes of distinguishing employees from independ-
ent contractors, are less helpful when considering whether a person is
an employee versus, for example, a volunteer 3 2 because they tend to
discount the "economic realities" underlying the relationship between
the parties. 33 For example, although a university exercises a consid-
erable degree of "control" over its students, the students are clearly
not "employees" of the university."3 Thus, outside of the independ-
ent contractor context, many courts have focused on the more funda-
mental question of whether any cognizable "employment
relationship" exists at all.' 35 Accordingly, these courts require a show-
ing of a basic employment relationship, which generally features the
exchange of labor for some form of compensation, and are less per-
suaded by traditional "control" arguments. 31
The de-emphasis of common law factors designed to distinguish em-
ployees from independent contractors was most clearly illustrated in
Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, Inc.'37 In Graves, the
plaintiff, a male rodeo barrel racer, brought a Title VII action against
the Women's Professional Rodeo Association ("WPRA"), a nonprofit
corporation organized for the purpose of promoting rodeo barrel
130. See O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that tests
for determining employee status are "culled" from the Restatement of Agency);
Dowd, supra note 88, at 77-86 (recounting the development of common law tests).
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. Volunteers have been found to be outside Title VII's protection because their
services are gratuitous, and therefore they ostensibly have little to lose if discrimi-
nated against. See, e.g., Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that voluntary lecturer on college campus was not a Title VII "employee"
simply because he "rendered service to an appreciative defendant"), affd, 898 F.2d 10
(2d Cir. 1990); Smith v. Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (concluding that unpaid volunteers are not employees within the meaning of
Title VII because they are not "susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the
Act was designed to eliminate") (citation omitted); see also Dunn, supra note 12, at
458-61 (discussing the status of volunteers under Title VII). Other groups that are
beyond the scope of Title VII include shareholders, see Norman v. Levy, 767 F. Supp.
1441, 1446-47 (N.D. Ill. 1991), general partners in an accounting firm, see Wheeler v.
Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277 (10th Cir. 1987), and applicants to a graduate studies
program, see Pollack v. Wm. Marsh Rice Univ., 690 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1982).
133. See Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795.
134. Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990).
135. See infra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
136. See, eg., Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795 (rejecting an argument that volunteers at a
television station were employees by virtue of the station's control over them. because
a "control" analysis is directed towards the distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor). For a discussion of the compensation requirement, see infra
notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
137. 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990).
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races.138 The plaintiff, Lance Graves, alleged that the WPRA imper-
missibly denied him membership on the basis of his gender.139 After
finding that the WPRA was not an "employer" under Title VII be-
cause it lacked the jurisdictional minimum number of employees re-
quired by Title VII, 14 ° the district court granted summary judgment
for the WPRA. 14 1 The issue of who constitutes an "employee" was
critical in Graves because if the members of the WPRA were "em-
ployees," then the WPRA would meet the jurisdictional requirements
for an "employer" under Title VII.142
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of Graves's case, concluding that the membership roster of the WPRA
could not be reasonably construed as a list of employees. 43 In so do-
ing, the court rejected the appellant's argument that the WPRA mem-
bers were employees because their relationship with the WPRA
satisfied the common law "right to control" test.144 Judge Bowman
found the "right to control" test, which focuses on the degree of con-
trol that an employer exercises over a worker, to be inapposite on the
facts of the case. 145
The court explained that before invoking any of the common law
tests for establishing who is an "employee," the plaintiff was first re-
quired to demonstrate that an "employment relationship" existed,
"according to the ordinary meaning of the words.' 46 As to this fun-
damental element of proof, the plaintiff had failed to carry his burden
because the WPRA members received no compensation 47 and be-
cause membership in the WPRA entailed no duty of service to the
WPRA or anyone else. 148 Therefore, irrespective of whether the
WPRA exercised control over the members, its relationship with the
138. Id. at 71.
139. Id.
140. Under Title VII, an "employer" is defined as a person who has fifteen or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Because only "employers" are subject to Title VII,
a business that employs fewer than fifteen employees cannot be exposed to Title VII
liability. See id.
141. Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 708 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
142. See Graves, 907 F.2d at 72.
143. Id. at 73-74.
144. Id. For a discussion on the common law "right to control" test, see supra part
III.A.I.
145. Graves, 907 F.2d at 73.
146. Id.
147. Id. Specifically, the court found that while some prize money was awarded to
WPRA members, the money was provided exclusively by outside sponsors, and the
winner did not necessarily have to be a member of the WPRA. Id.
148. Id. This factor appeared far less influential to the court's holding than the lack
of compensation received by WPRA members. See id. In fact, by noting that WPRA
members owed little duty of service to the WPRA, the court appeared to be respond-
ing directly to the appellant's argument that the WPRA enjoyed a "right to control"
its members. See id. The court's emphasis on this detail is perplexing because the
opinion painstakingly emphasized that application of the "right to control" test was
inappropriate on these facts.
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members was "so unlike" an employment relationship that the court
deemed it unnecessary to further probe the details of the
relationship. 49
Other courts have substantially agreed with the approach of the
Graves court in considering whether a person is an employee. For
example, in O'Connor, the Second Circuit held that it was inappropri-
ate to consider whether the plaintiff was an employee under the gen-
eral common law of agency because such a framework "ignore[d] the
antecedent question of whether O'Connor was hired ... for any pur-
pose."'150 In the court's view, she was not so hired."5 ' Similarly, in
Smith v. Berks Community Television,'-2 the district court declined to
accord substantial weight to the common law test that emphasized the
employer's control over the putative employee.'5 3 The court reasoned
that, because common law tests "are directed towards the distinction
between an employee and an independent contractor," they were not
dispositive of the issue of whether unpaid volunteers were
"employees.' 54
Graves and its companion cases suggest that while judicial tests for
determining employee status might in some cases be relevant to the
inquiry of who is an employee under Title VII, a court must first con-
sider whether an ordinary employment relationship exists.'55 As the
following discussion indicates, the phrase "ordinary employment rela-
tionship" should be read expansively in keeping with Title VII's broad
purposes. 56 Evidence of compensation, however, is central to a find-
ing of an employment relationship."s
149. Id at 74.
150. O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d. Cir. 1997). The court's opinion sug-
gests, by its use of the word "hired," that the Second Circuit was addressing the same
problem that arose in Graves-determining whether an ordinary employment rela-
tionship exists. See id. (referring to the "antecedent question" of whether there was a
relationship upon which a legal test for employee status could reasonably be applied).
Citing the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Graves, the court in O'Connor stated that any
ordinary employment relationship-even one where the court ultimately finds that
the plaintiff is an independent contractor rather than an employee-must involve
compensation, or else any common law test for employee status is inapplicable. See id.
at 115-16; supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text. For a recounting of the facts in
O'Connor, see supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
151. O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 115.
152. 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
153. See id. at 795.
154. Id.
155. This is especially true outside the context of cases in which a court must deter-
mine whether a worker was an "employee" or an "independent contractor" for pur-
poses of Title VII. For a discussion of that line of cases, see Dowd, supra note 88,
passin, and Davidson, supra note 15, passini. For a discussion of the applicability of
common law tests to determining employee status outside the "independent contrac-
tor" framework, see supra notes 130-54 and accompanying text.
156. See infra Part III.B.1.
157. See infra Part III.B.2.
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t. The Supreme Court's Broad Reading of the Employment
Relationship
In Graves, the court held that for the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the WPRA members were "employees" for purposes of Title VII, it
was first necessary to establish that an ordinary employment relation-
ship existed between the WPRA and its members.158 While holding
that an ordinary employment relationship should involve some form
of compensation,'59 the court did not offer other guidelines defining
the boundaries of employment relationships. Despite the Eighth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the WPRA and its members lacked an employ-
ment relationship, courts have generally construed the employment
relationship broadly to effectuate Congress's goals in enacting Title
VII.160
The Supreme Court has defined the scope of the employment rela-
tionship expansively for purposes of Title VII, as was illustrated in two
landmark cases. The first, Hishon v. King & Spalding,'6' dealt with
whether eligibility for partnership status in a law firm could be consid-
ered a term of employment. The second, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 6 '
addressed the issue of whether a former employee maintained an em-
ployment relationship with his former employer for purposes of Title
VII.
In Hishon, the Supreme Court held that a female associate who was
denied partnership status could bring suit under Title VII, even
though partners of the firm were not themselves "employees.' '1 63
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, rejected the Eleventh
Circuit's holding that a decision to extend an offer to join a partner-
ship is necessarily beyond the scope of an employment relationship. 6 4
Instead, the Court found that partnership status was a "term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment"' 65 because associates at the defend-
ant's firm could regularly expect to be considered for partnership at
the end of their "apprenticeships.' 1 66 Because there was an implicit
agreement that if an associate remained in good standing she would
be made partner after a certain number of years, the employment re-
158. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
159. Graves v. Women's Profl Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990).
160. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
161. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
162. 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
163. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 76-79.
164. Id. at 75; see also 1 Matthew Bender, supra note 106 § 4.03, at 4-24 (2d ed.
1997) (discussing the holding in Hishon). For the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, see
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
165. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 75.
166. "Apprenticeships" in this case referred to the period of employment spent as
an associate of the firm. Id. at 76. "Partner" referred to one of more than fifty part-
ners in a general partnership. Id. at 71.
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lationship in Hishon was held to include an implied promise to be
considered for partnership status.167
Hishon stopped short of declaring that partners in a law firm have
an employment relationship with the firm; the partners themselves
were not protected by Title VII.'6 The Court indicated, however,
that the contract creating an employment relationship may be an "in-
formal" one that "arise[s] by the simple act of... providing a work-
place.' 1 69 Moreover, the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of that
relationship should be viewed expansively to guarantee fairness in em-
ployment, and encompass such tangential benefits as the prospect of
eventually earning partner status. 70
In Robinson, the Court again elected to define the employment re-
lationship expansively. In Robinson, an African-American plaintiff
sued his former employer under Title VII, alleging that the employer
had given him a negative reference in retaliation for an earlier dis-
crimination claim the plaintiff had filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 17t Responding to the em-
ployer's argument that Title VII's protection of "employees" did not
extend to former employees, the Court acknowledged that "[alt first
blush, the term 'employees'. . . would seem to refer to those having an
existing employment relationship with the employer in question."'"
The Court rejected such a limited reading of Title VII, however, be-
cause where Title VII was "ambiguous" as to whether former employ-
ees should merit statutory protection, the Court found it proper to
base its determination on "the broader context of Title VII and the
primary purposes of [the statute]."'"m This conclusion was strength-
ened by the fact that Title VII forbids discriminatory discharge and, if
former employees could not bring suit, that purpose would be
thwarted.174 Consequently, the Court held that former employees
were within Title ViI's definition of "employee."'75
167. See id at 76 ("[T]he benefit of partnership consideration was allegedly linked
directly with an associate's status as an employee .... ).
168. In fact, in his concurring opinion, Justice Powell emphasized that the Court's
opinion should not be read to extend Title VII to the management of a law firm by its
partners. See id.; see also Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277 (10th Cir. 1987)
(finding that a general partner in an accounting firm was not an "employee" under
Title VII).
169. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 74.
170. Id
171. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 845 (1997). The initial charge filed
with the EEOC was still pending when the unlawful retaliation claim was brought to
trial. Id.
172. Id. at 846.
173. Id- at 849.
174. See id.
175. Id-
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2. The Critical Element of Compensation
While Hishon and Robinson demonstrate the Court's willingness to
interpret the employment relationship expansively, courts have con-
sistently declined to extend Title VII's protection when there has been
insufficient evidence of "compensation," which is the hallmark of an
employment relationship.176 Outside of Title VII jurisprudence, an
employment relationship has been found to exist absent compensa-
tion.177 In Title VII cases, however, an employee must have received
compensation to be covered by the statute because, if a person has
nothing to gain by performing a service for another, he is not "suscep-
tible to the discriminatory practices which [Title VII] was designed to
eliminate." '178
Thus, resolving the question of whether there was an employment
relationship for purposes of Title VII will often hinge on the court's
determination of whether there was adequate compensation to form
the basis of an employment relationship.179 The Fourth Circuit grap-
pled with this issue in Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising
Sun.18 ° In Haavistola, the plaintiff, a female volunteer firefighter,
brought an action against the fire company that alleged unlawful sex
176. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that "remuneration" is an "essential condition" of an employment relationship);
Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that
compensation by the putative employer to the putative employee in exchange for his
services is an "essential condition" to the existence of an employment relationship,
and therefore contestants in a rodeo who received no substantive compensation were
not "employees" under Title VII); Hall v. Delaware Council on Crime & Justice, 780
F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Del.), affd mem., 975 F.2d 1549 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that
workers who received no significant benefits other than free admission to an annual
luncheon were volunteers, and thus beyond the purview of Title VII).
177. See Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Smith, 742 S.W.2d 217,219 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that for purposes of determining tort liability, a trucker was "em-
ployed" by his brother even though his work was gratuitous because lack of compen-
sation did not remove him from the "employed" category); 27 Am. Jur. 2d
Employment Relationship § 8 (1996) ("Although an employment contract normally
requires the exchange of valuable consideration, an employment relationship may ex-
ist when a person volunteers to perform services for another person ...." (citations
omitted)).
178. Smith v. Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(quoting Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983)). Presumably,
volunteers are less susceptible to discriminatory practices because they do not have
the same economic reliance as employees, and are therefore more free to walk away
from a discriminatory situation. See id.
179. Courts have wrestled with the question of what compensation suffices to trig-
ger an employment relationship. Compare Hall, 780 F. Supp. at 241 (finding reim-
bursement for work-related expenses and free admittance to an annual luncheon
insufficient compensation to raise a volunteer to the status of an employee), with Hor-
nick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (concluding that
school crossing guards who worked "only a couple of hours a day" and were paid
"only $40.00 per month" were nonetheless "employees" within the meaning of Title
VII).
180. 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993).
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discrimination.' The district court dismissed her claim, finding that
she was not an employee covered by Title VII.Y- On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.1 3 The court began its analysis
by acknowledging that in order for the plaintiff to be considered an
"employee" under Title VII, she must have received compensation.1 4
The court then determined that the plaintiff had received no "direct"
compensation. 185 Nevertheless, the court rejected the district court's
conclusion that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was not an employee
under Title VII.18 6 Instead, the court held that "compensation is not
defined by statute or case law," and, consequently, the issue of
whether alleged benefits amounted to "compensation" for purposes of
establishing an employment relationship could "not be found as a
matter of law."'1 7 As a result, the district court had erred in not al-
lowing the jury to determine the ultimate issue of whether the indirect
benefits plaintiff received amounted to significant compensation, or
the "inconsequential incidents of an otherwise gratuitous
relationship.""
Haavistola has been understood to mean that a person can be an
"employee" under Title VII even without "receiv[ing] a paycheck.""8t
After Haavistola, it is no longer clear what constitutes sufficient com-
pensation to establish an employment relationship. According to the
Fourth Circuit, however, significant benefits outside of salary must be
181. Id. at 213.
182. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 812 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Md.),
rev'd, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993).
183. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 222.
184. See id. at 219 (noting that in cases where there is no evidence of compensation,
courts have found Title VII inapplicable).
185. Id at 221.
186. Id. at 222.
187. Id. at 221-22.
188. Id. at 222. The "indirect benefits" that plaintiff received included a state-
funded disability pension, survivors' benefits for dependents, scholarships for depen-
dents upon disability or death, bestowal of a state flag to family upon death in the line
of duty, benefits under the Federal Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act, insurance
coverage, reimbursement for job-related expenses, the ability to purchase without
paying extra fees a special commemorative registration plate for private vehicles, and
access to a method by which she may obtain ceriflication as a paramedic. i. at 221
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). On remand, a jury determined that these bene-
fits did not constitute sufficient compensation to form the basis of an employment
relationship. Haavistola, 839 F. Supp. at 372 (D. Md. 1994).
189. See Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 713 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (finding
that the "emotional benefit" a volunteer received from a charitable organization was
insufficient compensation to create an employment relationship under Title VII). The
Neff court cautioned, however, that Haavistola was an unusual decision, and further
noted that, on remand, the jury concluded that Haavistola was not an -employee"
within the definition of Title VII. Id. at 712. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged
that the absence of direct wages is not necessarily conclusive evidence that a person is
not an employee. Id.
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regarded as at least potentially sufficient compensation. 90 For exam-
ple, after Haavistola, a court may consider benefits that "create career
opportunities" as counting toward the compensation requirement.' 9'
The possibility that some unpaid interns may receive indirect compen-
sation sufficient to form the basis of an employment relationship is
explored in part IV.
IV. COURTS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ESTABLISHING A BRIGHT
LINE RULE THAT PRECLUDES ALL UNPAID INTERNS
FROM BEING CONSIDERED "EMPLOYEES"
UNDER TITLE VII
Parts II and III established that courts have consistently afforded
Title VII the broadest possible interpretation consistent with its statu-
tory language. This section argues that, in keeping with that trend,
courts should avoid establishing a bright line rule that precludes all
unpaid interns from being classified as "employees" under Title VII.
First, this part scrutinizes those cases that have focused on the issue
of "compensation" in denying unpaid workers employee status under
Title VII. While Title VII may provide no protection for volunteers,
some courts have endorsed an unprincipled expansion of the term
"volunteer" to include any worker who does not receive a salary.
"Compensation" is not necessarily limited to money, however, and
may include a variety of different types of benefits. This section ar-
gues that courts should remain open to the possibility that some un-
paid interns receive sufficient "compensation" to establish an
employment relationship.
This part then advocates application of the hybrid test to cases in-
volving unpaid interns. Although some courts have found judicial
tests to be inapplicable outside of "independent contractor" cases be-
cause such tests traditionally have focused exclusively on an em-
ployer's right to control, the modern hybrid test incorporates the
"economic realities" of an employment relationship, thereby broaden-
ing its applicability. Therefore, this part argues that the hybrid test is
useful for defining an employment relationship in any context, and
that tinder a hybrid analysis, many unpaid interns would be regarded
as employees.
Finally, this part argues that even if the hybrid test is to be limited
in application to the "independent contractor" context, courts should
still remain open to the possibility that at least some unpaid interns
may be employees under Title VII. This Note concludes by proposing
190. See Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220; see also Neff, 916 F. Supp. at 712 (leaving open
the possibility that "benefits that create career opportunities" might potentially
amount to adequate compensation).
191. See Neff, 916 F. Supp. at 713.
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certain factors courts should consider in determining whether an un-
paid intern may be afforded employee status under Title VII.
A. Unpaid Interns May be a Party to an "Employment
Relationship"
Some courts have held that, as a rule, certain relationships are so
unlike an "employment relationship" that they do not merit consider-
ation under any of the judicial tests devised to measure employee sta-
tus under Title VII.192 Often preceding this conclusion is a finding
that the putative employee received no "compensation" that could
reasonably form the basis of an employment relationship." '3 Ade-
quacy of compensation, however, remains an open question."
1. Compensation Should Not be Limited to Monetary Wages
In O'Connor v. Davis,195 the Second Circuit held that an unpaid
intern could not be considered an "employee" under Title VII be-
cause she received no compensation. 196 The term "compensation,"
however, is ambiguous, for purposes of Title VII, and in general."9
Even if Title VII necessarily requires that an "employee" receive com-
pensation for his labor,198 the quality and quantity of compensation
needed to establish a bona fide employment relationship remains un-
certain.19 9 The Fourth Circuit held in Haavistola that there is no de-
fined legal standard for what constitutes "compensation. ''2 00
Moreover, the dictionary that the court cited defines an "employee"
192. See supra Part III.A.
193. See supra Part III.B.2.
194. See supra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
195. 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997).
196. Id. at 115.
197. See supra Part III.B.2.
198. In Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993),
the court identified two lines of cases that have developed on the construction of the
word "employee" under Title VII:
The first group deals with the situation in which compensation is uncon-
tested, but the parties disagree as to whether the degree of control exerted
over the putative employee evidences an independent contracting relation-
ship. The second group involves those cases in which there is no evidence of
compensation and, in all cases, the courts have found Title VII inapplicable.
Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
In the broader context of employment relationships, however, it appears that com-
pensation is not dispositive. Rather, common law agency principles focusing on the
employer's right of control have been applied to conclude that an uncompensated
worker can in fact be deemed an employee. See Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 742 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
199. See Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221-22; Neff v. Civil Air Patrol. 916 F. Supp. 710,713
(S.D. Ohio 1996).
200. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221-22.
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as someone employed by another "usu[ally] in a position .. .for
wages," as opposed to someone who always works for wages.20
Ib be sure, there are many cases where a person who does not re-
ceive wages cannot reasonably be considered an employee within the
meaning of Title VII.2 12 For example, benefits such as the "challenge
of assisting people in need" and "self-esteem" have been rightly dis-
counted as inadequate forms of compensation to constitute the basis
of an employment relationship, because they are unrelated to any
"potential financial benefits. '2 °3
These facts, however, do not lead to an inevitable conclusion that
unpaid interns must, de facto, be considered volunteers rather than
employees. To the contrary, there is room within the definition of
"compensation" to consider benefits that, although arguably less eas-
ily identifiable than wages, are equally real. Under Title VII, volun-
teers are not employees because they are "not susceptible to the same
types of economic pressures" as employees and, therefore, are not
prone to suffer the same effects from an employer's wrongful discrimi-
nation. 4 But in the case of many unpaid internships, interns are sus-
ceptible to these economic pressures and may rely heavily on benefits
provided by the internship such as indispensable work experience, ac-
ademic credit, the opportunity to audition for a job, and valuable em-
ployer references.0 5
Under a regime that limits the meaning of "compensation" to sal-
ary, an employee who works part time for negligible wages would en-
joy full protection under Title VII, but an unpaid intern who works
full time in a highly specialized position in fulfillment of an academic
requirement, understanding that she is auditioning for a salaried posi-
tion, would be excluded from coverage. 0 6 This scenario seems anom-
201. Id. at 220 (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 743 (1981) (emphasis
added)).
202. See Neff, 916 F. Supp. at 712 (noting that outside of Haavistola, federal courts
have consistently found that unpaid workers are volunteers rather than employees).
203. See id. at 713. Non-financial benefits are not protected by Title VII because
denial of such benefits does not pose the threat of economic harm against which Title
VII was intended to protect. See id.
204. Id. at 712; accord Smith v. Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795
(E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Unpaid volunteers are not susceptible to the discriminatory prac-
tices which [Title VII] was designed to eliminate."). Although neither Neff nor Smith
makes clear why unpaid volunteers are not as susceptible to discriminatory practices
as employees, presumably it is because they have less at stake in their position and are
therefore more free to mitigate the effects of discrimination by simply walking away.
205. See supra Part I.A. Interns may be susceptible to additional pressure if they
need to complete their internship to graduate. See supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
206. These examples are borrowed from actual cases. The intern example is a rep-
resentation of what happened to Bridget O'Connor. See O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d
112 (2d Cir. 1997). Though not a Title VII case, for an example of an unpaid intern
who received important benefits from her internship, but would not be covered by
Title VII under the court's holding in O'Connor, see Davis v. Wyoming Medical
Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1248-49 (Wyo. 1997) (describing one unpaid internship
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alous given that one of Title VII's principal aims is the assurance of
equal employment opportunities in the workplace.0 7
Considering both Title VII's goals and Haavistola's reasoning that
the adequacy of compensation must be measured according to the
facts of each case, it would be peculiar to deny an unpaid intern Title
VII's protection when her internship may provide the key to long-
term economic security."08 Yet by lumping unpaid interns together
with all other non-salaried persons, the Second Circuit in O'Connor
did just that by overlooking critical distinctions between the benefits
received by an unpaid intern and a true "volunteer. 209
Title VII is "remedial in nature" and should be given the "broadest
interpretation consistent with its purpose. 210 Moreover, in cases that
bear on the breadth of the employment relationship, the Supreme
Court has favored an expansive reading of Title VII's protective pro-
visions.2"' And while the text of Title VII may define the term "em-
ployee" with "magnificent circularity, '21 2  a broad reading of
where the intern worked 600 hours to earn her applied science degree in surgical
technology with the understanding that she would be offered a paid position by the
sponsor at the end of her internship). The example of the part-time employee reflects
the court's findings of fact in Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091. 1098
(M.D. Penn. 1980) (concluding that part-time school crossing guards were employees
under Title VII).
207. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). Even more
anomalous is that if the employer decides to hire the intern, it could conceivably have
discriminated against the intern throughout the duration of her internship without
incurring Title VII liability, but be forced to stop the moment the intern is "hired" for
salary.
208. The link between internships and long term economic stability is not attenu-
ated, as often an unpaid internship represents the only feasible way to secure a per-
manent position in a given career field. See supra Part I.A. Moreover, that
connection is expected to become more prominent in the near future. See Fram, supra
note 27, at 43 (noting that in the future, more education and training will take place
on the job and more employers may seek to evaluate final job applicants via unpaid
internships).
209. The Second Circuit relied on Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n,
907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990), as support for the proposition that "[wlhere no financial
benefit is obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no 'plausible' em-
ployment relationship of any sort can be said to exist ...." O'Connor, 126 F.3d at
115-16 (quoting Graves, 907 F.2d at 73). Graves, however, presented significantly dif-
ferent facts than O'Connor. In Graves, the "employees" were voluntary contestants
in a rodeo who competed for prize money distributed by an outside sponsor. Graves,
907 F.2d at 73. Similarly, the court analogized O'Connor to Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F.
Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990). O'Connor, 126 F3d at
116. But that case also featured markedly different facts from O'Connor In Tadros,
the plaintiff was designated a "Visiting Lecturer" by the Cornell University Medical
College, but had no regularly assigned work hours, never delivered a single lecture
(notwithstanding his title), and received absolutely no identifiable benefit outside of
free access to the Medical College's library. Tadros, 717 F. Supp. at 998.
210. Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies. Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 941 (D.
Colo. 1979).
211. See supra Part III.B.1.
212. Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
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"employee" is consistent with the broader context of Title VII.2 13 Ti-
tle VII's goal of remedying discrimination in the workplace would be
better served if courts recognized the important distinction between a
volunteer who works gratuitously214 and an unpaid intern who works
with an eye toward significant long-term economic reward. 15 More-
over, acknowledging such differences would comport with the courts'
tradition of liberally reading the word employee, as well as Haavis-
tola's directive to treat "compensation" as a factual, case-by-case
inquiry.
2. The Hybrid Approach Can be Used to Analyze Title VII Cases
Involving Unpaid Interns
Often, in cases that address whether a person is an employee or a
volunteer, courts have found common law agency tests inapposite be-
cause those tests are designed to distinguish employees from in-
dependent contractors, not from volunteers or other non-
employees.21 6 Specifically, common law tests have been limited to
"independent contractor" cases because those tests emphasize an em-
ployer's "power to control," which is not typically at issue in cases
where a person is alleged to be a volunteer, rather than an em-
ployee. 217 For example, in Smith v. Berks Community Television, 18
which required the court to distinguish employees from volunteers,
the court found common law "control" principles inapposite because
the television station workers in Smith were not alleged to be in-
dependent contractors. 1 9 Instead, the court held that the "economic
realities" of the relationship between the workers and the station
would be determinative of the workers' status as employees, because
that approach would ensure protection of those "susceptible" to dis-
criminatory practices. 220
213. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 848 (1997); see also Spirides v. Rein-
hardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[Bjecause [Title VII] is remedial in charac-
ter, it should be liberally construed, and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the
complaining party.").
214. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part I.A.
216. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding agency
analysis to be "flawed" when the issue is whether an unpaid intern had been "hired");
Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that courts only apply common law tests in situations that "plausibly approximate an
employment relationship"); Smith v. Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794,
795 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that cases directed towards the distinction between an
employee and an independent contractor are inapplicable to the issue of whether a
person was an employee or a volunteer). For examples of various categories of non-
employees beside independent contractors, see supra note 132.
217. See Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795.
218. Id. at 794.
219. Id. at 795.
220. Id. Finding that the television workers were not susceptible to discriminatory
practices, the Smith court found for the defendant. Id. at 794. The court suggested
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Under the "hybrid" test that virtually all courts now apply to distin-
guish independent contractors from employees, however, the "eco-
nomic realities" of the relationship are considered."2 In Spirides v.
Reinhardt m  the District of Columbia Circuit introduced the hybrid
test as a means of deciding whether the plaintiff in that case could be
"deemed an employee under Title VII. '  Although the defendant in
Spirides argued that the plaintiff was an independent contractor, there
is no indication from the opinion that the court intended to limit the
test to cases where a person is alleged to be an independent contrac-
tor.2 4 In fact, the same analysis was applied outside the "independent
contractor" context in Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising
Sun,' 2 where the Fourth Circuit analyzed employee status under the
hybrid test, even though the plaintiff in that case was not alleged to be
an independent contractor2 6 Oddly, the Haavistola court referred to
that unpaid workers should not be covered by Title VII because it would be difficult
to fashion an appropriate remedy when the worker never received any salary. See id.
at 795 ("[T]he remedy of back pay would be wholly inappropriate for unpaid work-
ers."). Following a 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act, however, Title VII plain-
tiffs may now receive compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (1994). Another viable remedy is injunctive relief, such as an order to cease
discriminatory conduct or reinstatement of an unpaid worker terminated due to ille-
gal discrimination. See Dunn, supra note 12, at 466.
221. See supra Part III.A.3. Interestingly, the district court in Smith relied on the
pure "economic realities" test as defined by the Sixth Circuit in Armbnster r. Quinn,
711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983). Given the court's statement that the "control" test was
inapposite because it neglected to consider the adequacy of compensation, however,
one can infer that the "hybrid" test would be applicable because that test considers
both the employer's right to control the employee and the economic realities of the
relationship. See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explain-
ing that the determination of employee status under Title VII involves analysis of the
economic realities of the relationship, but "the employer's right to control the 'means
and manner' of the worker's performance is the most important factor to review"
(citations omitted); see also Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir.
1982) ("[lt is the economic realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common
law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the employee that
are determinative [of who is an employee under Title VII].").
222. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
223. Id. at 831; see also Cobb, 673 F.2d at 339 (describing the issue of "employee
status" generally, as opposed to employee status versus independent contractor
status).
224. The hybrid test might be misinterpreted as exclusively a test for distinguishing
employees from independent contractors, but that is most easily attributable to the
overwhelming number of "independent contractor" cases to which the hybrid test has
been applied. See supra Part III.A.3.
225. 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993).
226. Haavistola examined whether the benefits that the plaintiff received were suf-
ficient to render her an employee as opposed to a volunteer. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221.
Although Chief Judge Ervin acknowledged that "[c]ontrol loses some of its signifi-
cance in the determination of whether an individual is an employee in those situations
in which compensation is not evident," id. at 220, he still analyzed the facts "under a
standard that incorporates both the common law test derived from principles of
agency and the so-called 'economic realities' test," which is the essence of the hybrid
test. See id. at 219 (citations omitted).
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"[t]wo lines of cases" that have developed regarding the construction
of "employee" under Title VII,227 and described them as follows:
'The first group deals with the situation in which compensation is
uncontested, but the parties disagree as to whether the degree of
control exerted over the putative employee evidences an independ-
ent contracting relationship. The second group involves those cases
in which there is no evidence of compensation and, in all cases, the
courts have found Title VII inapplicable.228
The court then implicitly acknowledged a third type of case in which
control is not at issue, but compensation is. 229 As to this third line of
cases, the court still applied the hybrid test, but with the understand-
ing that "[c]ontrol loses some of its significance" when the disputed
issue is whether compensation existed."0
These cases suggest that the hybrid test can be helpful in analyzing
employee status questions beyond the limited context of independent
contractor cases. The court's holding in Graves v. Women's Profes-
sional Rodeo Ass'n,2 3 1 that it was "unnecessary 232 to consider any
judicial tests for employee status, overlooks the comprehensive nature
of the hybrid test, which focuses on an employer's right to control and
the employee's economic realities.2 33 The court confused the analysis
by first concluding that there was no "plausible employment relation-
ship" and then using that conclusion to justify skipping the inquiry
into whether there was, in fact, an employment relationship.
Although application of the hybrid test in Graves would probably
still result in a finding that rodeo contestants were not employees
under Title VII,234 the same is not necessarily true for O'Connor. In
O'Connor, the Second Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit in Graves, de-
clined to apply any of the traditional tests for employee status, includ-
ing the hybrid test, because there was no "plausible" employment
relationship between an unpaid intern and the defendant psychiatric
hospital.2 35 Apparently, the court only considered the "right to con-
227. Id. at 219.
228. Id.
229. This third line of cases was illustrated by the facts in Haavistola. Id. at 213-14;
see supra note 190.
230. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220. Similarly, the district court in Smith emphasized the
"economic realities" element of the hybrid test, finding it to be most relevant to the
issue of whether the putative employees were employees or volunteers. See Smith v.
Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
231. 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990).
232. Id. at 74.
233. See supra Part III.A.3.
234. In Graves, the "economic realities" weighed against the plaintiff in that the
WPRA members participated only for the unlikely chance to win prize money, and
the WPRA members were subject to minimal control by the WPRA. See Graves, 907
F.2d at 73.
235. O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997).
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trol" element of the hybrid test2 6 and, therefore, concluded that such
an analysis would be inapposite when the real issue is whether the
plaintiff had received any meaningful benefit from her work.237 But
the hybrid test, which would have examined O'Connor's economic de-
pendency on her internship in light of Rockland's right to control her
activities, would determine the very issue that the court summarily
resolved before applying any analysis at alll-8 whether O'Connor
was in fact an employee.
Had the O'Connor court applied the hybrid test, it might have con-
cluded that O'Connor had relied on certain benefits incident to the
internship when she accepted the position at Rockland, thereby creat-
ing an implicit employment contract.2 9 Instead, the court dismissed
O'Connor's claims without considering her "economic realities,"
thereby failing to apply the "hybrid" test to the very question it was
designed to resolve, and signaling a broad refusal to acknowledge the
employment realities of many unpaid interns.
Under the hybrid test, an unpaid intern might well be considered an
employee. The "right to control" element, which is the cornerstone of
any hybrid analysis,2" is typically present in unpaid internships where
interns are often designated substantially similar responsibilities to
full employees.24' As for the "economic realities" portion of the hy-
brid test, in many professions an unpaid internship represents a neces-
sary step toward career stability. 24 2 Oftentimes, colleges and
universities require that students complete an unpaid internship as
part of their chosen major.243 In still others, employers hire full-time
salaried employees from their pool of interns, which essentially ren-
ders the internship another step in the promotional chain.2 While a
hybrid analysis may produce different outcomes in different cases, at
least in the case of some unpaid internships, it would be appropriate
under the hybrid test to acknowledge an employment relationship for
purposes of Title VII.
236. Id. at 115 ("In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the
manner and means by which the product is accomplished." (quoting Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989))).
237. See O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 115.
238. See id. at 115 (finding the "antecedent question of whether O'Connor was
hired by Rockland for any purpose" to be dispositive).
239. See Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211,221 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding that whether indirect benefits amount to sufficient compensation to
establish an employment relationship is a question of fact).
240. See supra Part III.A.3.
241. See supra Part I.B.
242. See supra Part I.A.
243. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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B. Factors Courts Might Consider in Determining Whether Unpaid
Interns Have an Employment Relationship with Their
Sponsors
Assuming that the hybrid test must be limited to cases where the
issue is a person's status as an employee or an independent contractor,
courts should still consider other, non-wage, factors suggestive of an
ordinary employment relationship to determine whether a person is
an employee under Title VII. These factors might include the fre-
quency and overall number of similar internships in the particular
field, the value of the intern's services to the employer, the benefits
the intern receives from the internship, including indirect, long-term
career gains, or other similar considerations that acknowledge modern
employment realities while reasonably limiting the scope of Title VII.
An employment contract that calls for the exchange of labor for
indirect compensation such as academic credits, referrals, the promise
of a future salaried position, or simply much-needed experience, may
be more difficult to discern than one that provides for the simple ex-
change of labor for money. Complexity alone, however, should not
place a putative employment relationship outside the realm of Title
VII, which must not be "thwarted by concern for judicial
economy. "245
By establishing factors that limit "employment relationships" to
those cases where there is evidence of a clear economic benefit that
could only be reasonably obtained by completion of the internship,
courts can successfully limit the number of actions brought under Title
VII. Moreover, the status of "employees" under Title VII has never
been a clear cut question, as is poignantly evidenced by the "in-
dependent contractor" cases, where courts must weigh an abundance
of fact-specific considerations to properly resolve employee status.2 46
In all likelihood, not every unpaid intern will qualify as an "em-
ployee" under Title VII. For example, in the case of some unpaid
internships, it may be that there are few career gains that arise out of
the internship, and the intern may be motivated by a general interest
in the business or a desire to perform charitable work. For many un-
paid interns, however, their internship experience is a "once-in-a-life
chance" to enter a highly competitive field where prior work experi-
ence is a practical demand.247 As for employers, many of them spon-
sor unpaid internships implicitly understanding that the interns are
"doing a job [they] should be paid for."2 48
245. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3rd Cir. 1977).
246. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (listing
eleven different factors courts must consider to determine whether a person is an
employee or an independent contractor under Title VII); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc.,
673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1982) (same).
247. See Marklein, supra note 26.
248. Prato, supra note 49.
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Market forces that permit many employers to get away with deny-
ing interns salary24 9 should not also grant employers immunity from
legitimate Title VII claims. Courts would further Title VII's goals of
ensuring equal opportunity in the pursuit of a livelihood by being
open to the realities that many unpaid interns face when entering the
job market and analyzing Title VII claims in light of those realities.
CONCLUSION
Today, more than ever, internships represent the key to an increas-
ingly competitive job market. Although many internships involve
substantive work similar to the kind performed by paid employees,
some employers have taken advantage of a tight job market by deny-
ing interns salary, despite their interns' substantial contributions to
their business. Nevertheless, most unpaid interns reap significant long
term rewards from interning, and many rely heavily on the indirect
benefits that certain internships provide.
In O'Connor v. Davis, °0 the Second Circuit opted for a bright line
rule that excludes all unpaid interns from protection under Title VII,
defying a well established judicial trend toward defining that statute
expansively. Such a rule, while advancing the interests of judicial
economy, threatens to thwart Congress's intent in enacting Title VII,
which purported to guarantee equal opportunity in the pursuit of a
livelihood. Moreover, a bright line rule precludes the application of
well-reasoned judicial tests that are specifically designed to evaluate a
person's employment status under Title VII.
Even if courts decline to apply traditional analysis for determining
employee status, they should still consider other factors that en-
courage the careful weighing of all relevant considerations, rather
than adopting a bright line rule that exempts all unpaid interns from
Title VII coverage. By considering carefully drawn factors that ac-
knowledge current employment conditions, courts can ensure equal
opportunity for those who are newly embarking on a career path,
while preserving the integrity and substance of Title VII.
249. See supra Part I.B.
250. 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997).
1998] 2647
Notes & Observations
